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Introduction
Traditional jihadist terrorism has rightfully dominated the attention of 
both nations' populations and their security apparatus for the past 
decade. Referring to terrorism conducted by trans-national, hierarchical, 
professionally trained and organized groups of Islamist terrorists, tradi-
tional jihadism has posed a serious threat with well-planned, well-funded, 
and complex, high casualty attacks. These groups are formed by opera-
tives who travel expressly to receive sophisticated training and attack tar-
gets outside of their home countries. The gold standard of this form of 
jihadism would be the original core of al-Qaida, or "al-Qaida Central,"1 in 
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Afghanistan, which created the franchise system of separate traditional 
organizations cooperating and coordinating through the leadership of al-
Qaida Central's "executive" staff.
These traditional, hierarchical groups still pose a significant threat 
throughout the world. The Islamist force Al-Shabab controls nearly the 
entire southern half of war-torn Somalia, and has recently launched 
renewed attacks on the presidential palace and African Union troops 
assigned to back the UN-recognized government.2 
The religiously-motivated Taliban in Afghanistan has stepped up its oper-
ations as well, in late May 2010 launching almost back-to-back attacks on 
Bagram and Kandahar, two of the International Security Assistance 
Forces' largest bases, along with a suicide bombing in Kabul. The attacks 
killed several high-ranking officers, and even forced three senior British 
Ministers to abruptly divert their official visit.3 These attacks were more 
daring and direct than the typical insurgent attack and showed that 
despite surges and new grand strategies, the Taliban is far from defeated.
Franchise organization al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has 
become a leader in the field of traditional jihadism. It has established sev-
eral bases, engaged Saudi forces on the Yemeni border, and very nearly 
assassinated the Kingdom's security chief with a "keistered" bomb.4 The 
group publishes its own propaganda, and has claimed credit for the failed 
2009 Christmas Day bombing attempt on a flight to Detroit.5 In many 
ways, through doctrine, propaganda, and physical operations, AQAP has 
arguably taken the forefront in jihadism from al-Qaida Central.
The danger and effectiveness of religiously motivated terrorist organiza-
tions is undeniable. However, a different type of threat is on the rise on 
the global playing field as a result of the ongoing operations against these 
organizations. "Devolved" jihadism, Islamist terrorism conducted by 
native, amateur, untrained, and unfunded individuals or small ad hoc 
groups, has recently garnered headlines and the attention of terrorists 
and counterterrorists alike. These devolved jihadist operations are 
planned and carried out by native members of a country's populace, radi-
calized in their home country, resulting in the interchangeable monikers 
of "homegrown" or "grassroots" jihadism.6 
Both traditional and devolved jihadism are carried out by dangerous indi-
viduals determined to carry out what they believe is a religiously man-
dated struggle against evil, and both are credible threats. Devolved 
jihadism, spurred by the Global War on Terror and other counterterror-
ism initiatives, is becoming an increasingly popular tactic, and has many 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 3  No. 4
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol3/iss4/9
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.3.4.4Devolving Jihadism
65
advantages over traditional jihadism, though it has several drawbacks as 
well. In terms of physical damage and number of casualties from attacks, 
homegrown jihadism is something of a paper tiger, but its potential for 
psychological impact and damage means it is still a threat that must not 
be underestimated.
Impetus to Devolution
Grassroots jihadism, indeed homegrown terrorism of any kind, is not 
new. The Unabomber was a homegrown terrorist. El Sayyid Nosair, con-
victed of killing Rabbi Meir Kahane and involvement in the 1993 World 
Trade Center bombing conspiracy, was a foreign-born but domestically 
radicalized terrorist. For decades, homegrown terrorists have acted with-
out official training or organizational support.
The emergence of al-Qaida, however, grabbed any attention away from 
homegrown terrorism. With its franchise system of established hierarchi-
cal terrorist organizations hitching their wagon to ibn Ladin's core group 
for training and funding, and model of complex, professional, and high-
damage attacks—like the USS Cole bombing and 9/11, al-Qaida Central 
dominated security apparatus' attention. The term "jihadist" became 
lodged in the public consciousness, and grew to mean foreign fighters 
trained in desert terrorist camps to carry out well-planned, logistically-
backed attacks.
Interestingly, the response to this model of jihadism, the Global War on 
Terror, is what ultimately led to devolution. The Global War on Terror 
began with Operation Enduring Freedom and one primary, legitimate 
goal: "to disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations." 
This was the initial intent for the invasion of Afghanistan,7 and in this 
regard, the invasion of Afghanistan was a definitive success.
Negative media attention on military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq 
has often overshadowed the degrading of terrorist capabilities and the 
positive downward effects on global terrorism trends. Al-Qaida Central 
has not carried out a major attack in nearly a decade, and is nearly mar-
ginalized on the front lines.8 The disruption caused by the Global War on 
Terror has relegated al-Qaida Central to a doctrinal and propaganda role, 
supplying theoretical and spiritual support rather than physical. This 
inability of al-Qaida prime to launch subsequent successful international 
attacks in the mold of 9/11, or even the USS Cole bombing, has brought 
about the prominence of franchise organizations such as AQAP and the 
devolved, grassroots jihadists.9 
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Would-be jihadists, cognizant of increased security crackdowns and al-
Qaida's loss of safe haven in Afghanistan, have understood they cannot 
travel to training camps or take delivery of large sums of funding. They 
have adapted to this hurdle with individual, amateur operations; some 
small-scale, some of a more ambitious nature. As stated previously, 
homegrown terrorists are not a new phenomenon, but the recent rise in 
headline-snatching operations and catchy names like "Jihad Jane" have 
renewed the novelty of grassroots jihadism.10 In fact, "Jihad Jane" deliv-
ers more Google hits than "Adam Gadahn" (an American citizen who has 
risen to the top ranks of al-Qaida) and "Zawahiri" (al-Qaida's number two 
man) combined. Terrorism depends on psychological impact as much as 
physical, and the shock value and notoriety of a blue-eyed blonde from 
Philadelphia carrying out jihad points out how psychologically dangerous 
homegrown jihadism can be.
Dangers and Vulnerabilities of Grassroots Jihadism
So far, successful attacks by grassroots jihadists have been relatively small 
affairs in terms of physical impact, though any loss of life is a tragedy. 
Handguns can only do so much damage. Attacks with the potential for 
more damage, such as the New York plot to attack a synagogue and 
National Guard base, or the recent Times Square car-bomb attempt, often 
prove unsuccessful for reasons that will be discussed below.
The true danger from grassroots jihadism comes from its psychological 
aspect, its "fear factor," which indeed is one of the defining aspects of ter-
rorism. The psychological impact has three facets; the shock of Americans 
carrying out attacks, the public nature of the targets, and the unpredict-
ability of and difficulty in preventing the attacks.
The first facet is easy to understand. The American populace rightfully 
has difficulty understanding how an Army major can decide to shoot up a 
base, or how a Baptist-raised Arkansas man can open fire on a recruiting 
station in the name of Islam. Fear and distrust, especially against inno-
cent Muslim Americans, can easily be sown and lead to a cycle of oppres-
sion that serves to validate jihadist claims.
The public nature of the attacks is both a restraint and boon of the grass-
roots jihadists. Amateur terrorists with limited resources and training are 
unlikely to have the wherewithal or logistics to access strategic military or 
government installations and often must settle for public areas. An attack 
on public areas, crowded with civilians and often symbolic of America, 
however, can have more of an impact than attacks on the military.
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Perhaps the biggest factor to sow discord and fears of insecurity is the 
seeming inability of the government and security infrastructure to pre-
vent these attacks. While media outlets' likeliness to under-report security 
successes may skew public opinion, this bias cannot be ignored, as public 
perception is a key battleground of terrorism. Hasan had been posting 
anti-American rhetoric on websites and verbalizing same to fellow offic-
ers. Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad, the Little Rock recruiting center 
shooter, had been investigated by the FBI after an arrest in Yemen, where 
he had been carrying fake Somali documents.11 The Christmas Day 
bomber had been reported by his father to American authorities and was 
even placed on the Terrorism Identities Datamart Environment.12 
The difficulties and failures have been enough to prompt the resignation 
of the Director of National Intelligence,13 arguably a hefty accomplish-
ment in favor of the jihadists. Instilling a lack of trust in the nation's secu-
rity apparatus and causing high-visibility disruptions in the United States 
is a far greater coup for global jihadism than the deaths of a few infidels.
The difficulty is not simply due to failings by the government. The FBI, 
tapped to lead terrorism operations in the United States, is ultimately an 
investigative body, primed more to take action after a crime has been 
committed. The real danger of grassroots jihadism is that it is impossible 
to act on what "might happen." In cases such as Abdulhakim Mujahid 
Muhammad, though he had been investigated for his arrest in Yemen, 
there was little to nothing to suggest he was about to carry out an attack. 
Homegrown terrorists, especially lone wolves, often carry out their 
attacks with little or no advance notice of their plans.
There is a positive side to the trend of amateur jihadism, though, in that it 
is just that: amateur. Homegrown terrorists may easily be able to grab a 
gun and open fire, but they lack the sophistication and tradecraft of pro-
fessional terrorists, which limits the impact of their attacks. While the Ft. 
Hood shooting deeply resonated across the country, a successful Times 
Square bombing would have caused far greater emotional and psycholog-
ical trauma for Americans.
The complexity, operational security, and expected damage of an 
attempted attack are proportional to its difficulty and likelihood of failure. 
The Times Square bomb was ultimately a dud and was called "amateur-
ish," as the builder did not have the training and skill to construct and 
detonate a functional weapon.14 
One of the greatest faults of almost all homegrown jihadists is a lack of 
operational security (protecting critical information, plans, and resources 
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that can be exploited by an adversary), especially in the pre-operational 
phase. Grassroots jihadists lack the experience and training of traditional 
jihadists, and are more likely to draw attention to themselves, either by 
getting noticed while surveilling a future target, or by alerting authorities, 
letting their plans be known to the wrong person. The New York cell 
attempting to bomb a synagogue and shoot down a military plane was 
apprehended because they attempted to buy bomb parts and Stinger anti-
aircraft missiles from undercover FBI agents, showing lack of fieldcraft 
and operational security.15 
This is, to borrow a term from private intelligence company STRATFOR, 
the "grassroots paradox."16 Homegrown terrorists may have the advan-
tage of being low-key and unpredictable, but they suffer from lack of 
training, sophistication, and downright ability. Quite simply, amateur ter-
rorists make amateur mistakes.
Recognition of the Threat
The U.S. Government has wisely taken note of the threat posed by 
homegrown, domestically radicalized individuals. For the first time in at 
least twelve years and three presidential administrations, domestic 
terrorism has received more than a passing mention in the President's 
National Security Strategy.17 In a section of the guideline document 
devoted to security at home, a substantial paragraph is addressed to 
grassroots terrorism:
"Empowering Communities to Counter Radicalization: Several 
recent incidences of violent extremists in the United States who 
are committed to fighting here and abroad have underscored the 
threat to the United States and our interests posed by individuals 
radicalized at home. Our best defenses against this threat are 
well-informed and equipped families, local communities, and 
institutions. The Federal Government will invest in intelligence to 
understand this threat and expand community engagement and 
development programs to empower local communities. And the 
Federal Government, drawing on the expertise and resources 
from all relevant agencies, will clearly communicate our policies 
and intentions, listening to local concerns, tailoring policies to 
address regional concerns, and making clear that our diversity is 
part of our strength—not a source of division or insecurity."18 
The 1998 National Security Strategy made no mention of domestic terror-
ism, despite the Oklahoma City bombing of the Murrah Federal building 
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three years prior.19 The fact that it is given such wide recognition attests 
to both the level of the threat, and the necessity to develop a defense 
against it. The Strategy calls for increased cooperation, education, and 
communication at all levels to counter domestic terrorism issues, a big 
step in the right direction to combating this dangerous and inherently elu-
sive threat.
Encouraging the Amateurs
The "professional" traditional jihadist organizations like al-Qaida have 
recognized the utility of homegrown, amateur terrorism and have encour-
aged it. The October 2009 issue of AQAP's propaganda and doctrine mag-
azine, Sada al-Malahim (Echo of Battle), included an article titled "War is 
a Trick." The article advised burgeoning jihadists that they "do not need to 
sacrifice huge efforts, or large amounts of money, to make 10 grams of 
explosives," and exhorted them to use materials in "your mother's kitchen 
and between your hands" to attack Crusaders, airliners, and transport 
systems wherever they are found.20 
Less than a month after the release of this article, U.S. Army psychiatrist 
Major Nidal Malik Hasan shocked the nation with a devastatingly simple 
attack. Walking up to a crowded section of Ft. Hood, armed with only two 
pistols, Hasan managed to kill thirteen people before being shot and 
apprehended.21 While an unsophisticated attack with a moderate number 
of casualties, the attack met the typical goal of terrorism: to attack the tar-
get's psyche rather than its material resources.
Hasan's attack inspired new calls to arms; the jihadist elite used this 
attack as an example to further promote the unsophisticated model. 
AQAP's December 2009 issue of Sada al-Malahim labeled Hasan an 
"heroic mujahid brother," and prompted service members to repent and 
"kill every Crusader using all the killing methods available."22 
Al-Qaida prime senior propaganda spokesman Adam Gadahn specifically 
dedicated his March 2010 English language message to Hasan. "A Call to 
Arms" extolled Hasan's virtue as a mujahid brother correcting his 
youthful mistake of joining a "Crusader" army, and extolled his use of 
available materials to carry out his jihad. Gadahn further urged 
homegrown jihadists to use "a little imagination and planning and a 
minimal budget" to choose weapons, and to attack any number of a 
myriad of strategic targets.23 
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The recognition and promotion of grassroots jihadism by the Islamic ter-
rorist elite is not insignificant. The purpose of this propaganda is to 
increase the base of support and it is, thus, easy to find on the Internet. 
Gadahn's "A Call to Arms" explicitly demands Muslims living among the 
"unbelievers and apostates" to emulate Hasan and carry out further 
attacks;24 inspiring new homegrown terrorists is the sole purpose of the 
communiqué.
Al-Qaida is laying out a game plan that almost anyone can follow, and glo-
bal security services should be prepared for more and more would-be, 
amateur jihadists to do so. Every new attack carried out by a grassroots 
jihadist, successful or not, is likely going to be followed by more calls for 
this relatively simple tactic.
Recommendations
The grassroots aspect of homegrown jihadists most definitely imparts sig-
nificant advantages to those wishing to do harm to the United States. It is 
incredibly difficult, if not impossible, to foresee and subsequently prevent 
a "never-seen-before" terrorist from firing on a crowd of people, or driv-
ing a truck or light aircraft into a heavily-populated building. Posting a 
manifesto proclaiming the act as jihad will instantly turn it into a fear-
fomenting phenomenon.
The "grassroots paradox," the danger of previously unknown terrorists 
juxtaposed against their lack of operational experience, however, provides 
security services and the public with the opportunity to combat home-
grown terrorism. Amateur terrorists lack the know-how and sophistica-
tion of professionals, and this lack of tradecraft is their primary 
vulnerability.
While it is a good turn of luck when attacks fail due to this incompetence, 
it is much more beneficial to exploit the incompetence in the planning/
surveillance "pre-operational" phase. This exploitation would take advan-
tage of homegrown terrorists' lack of experience. Operatives are at one of 
their most vulnerable points when initially surveilling or staking out a tar-
get as part of their planning. New people constantly walking around, tak-
ing pictures, notes, or video of a building or public place can stand out and 
get noticed if they aren't careful. Training people to be aware of the signs 
of pre-operational surveillance can lead to detection of homegrown ter-
rorists before they take overt action.
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The FBI has been doing commendable work with undercover agents 
exploiting the poor operational security of would-be terrorists, and appre-
hending cells seeking to purchase advanced weaponry, but this approach 
fails to address those who don't plan to use Stinger missiles, like the previ-
ously mentioned New York cell. It can also strain the resources of the FBI, 
which has fewer employees than the New York City Police Department, 
yet has the entire nation as its jurisdiction. Security forces, and indeed the 
general populace, must be educated about pre-operational activities, such 
as surveillance and resource gathering, and how to recognize them, as this 
is where grassroots jihadists will lack the most tradecraft and act sloppily. 
Cooperation between local, state, and federal agencies must be melded 
with increased public situational awareness to create a surveillance net 
able to detect pre-operational activities.
People taking detailed photographs of or notes about public buildings, 
posting threatening rhetoric on the Internet, or purchasing suspiciously 
large amounts of things like fertilizer and diesel fuel can all be key sus-
pects worthy of reporting. A sharp-eyed citizen reporting an obvious 
stakeout may not be enough to justify apprehending a would-be bomber, 
but it is enough to draw law enforcement's attention to the person, lead-
ing to the possible disruption of an attack before it occurs. After all, it was 
a hot-dog vendor in Times Square who first reported the suspicious smok-
ing Nissan in the failed bombing attempt.25 
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